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Global and Local Processing in Adult Humans (Homo sapiens),
5-Year-Old Children (Homo sapiens), and Adult Cotton-Top Tamarins
(Saguinus oedipus)
Julie J. Neiworth, Amy J. Gleichman, Anne S. Olinick, and Kristen E. Lamp
Carleton College
This study compared adults (Homo sapiens), young children (Homo sapiens), and adult tamarins
(Saguinus oedipus) while they discriminated global and local properties of stimuli. Subjects were trained
to discriminate a circle made of circle elements from a square made of square elements and were tested
with circles made of squares and squares made of circles. Adult humans showed a global bias in testing
that was unaffected by the density of the elements in the stimuli. Children showed a global bias with
dense displays but discriminated by both local and global properties with sparse displays. Adult tamarins’
biases matched those of the children. The striking similarity between the perceptual processing of adult
monkeys and humans diagnosed with autism and the difference between this and normatively developing
human perception is discussed.
Keywords: global precedence, local bias, perception, discrimination, cotton-top tamarins
A critical early process of visual cognition is the perceptual
parsing of the visual input or, more specifically, the cognitive work
of grouping features for object identification. This seems to happen
in humans via two broad categories or principles: global property
assessment, by which the viewer attends to overall shape despite
local feature differences, and gestalt principles, by which the
viewer connects features into groupings (like proximity, similarity,
and closure) to define shapes. In the simplest of terms, global
assessment involves object identification by whole contour and is
not affected by local element change, whereas gestalt assessment
involves object identification by interelement relationships and
thus is critically affected by local element change. Because of this
difference, global processing has been described as the processing
of place relationships (Kimchi, 1990, 1992), whereas gestalt pro-
cessing has been described as the processing of nature relation-
ships wherein it is necessary to assess operations both within and
between groups of elements to identify objects (Quinlan & Wilton,
1998).
Adult humans process visual stimuli by gestalt principles and by
global properties first. Various researchers have demonstrated a
global precedence effect (Navon, 1977, 1981) by which human
adults respond more quickly to the global properties (i.e., the shape
and overall contour) of figures constructed of smaller stimuli (the
local property) and notice the elements of construction only later in
the process. Global assessment and gestalt principles share com-
mon characteristics in human perceptual processing; for example,
both seem to occur primarily in the right hemisphere in humans
(van Kleek & Kosslyn, 1989), and both occur temporally early in
the processing of percepts (Triesman & Peterson, 1984). By these
characteristics, one may assume that these processes are special-
ized adaptations in humans and may have evolved as hardwired
modules of the human perceptual system. Evidence from devel-
opmental studies has suggested that the bias emerges with devel-
opment and is constrained by the stimulus context. Cassia, Simion,
Milani, and Umitla (2002) found that newborn infants look longer
at, and thus attend to, changes in both local features and global
features, and Ghim and Eimas (1988) found similar results in
3-month-olds. In one experiment in each of these multiple exper-
iment studies, there was a global advantage demonstrated, but only
in a particular task in which two novel stimuli with conflicting
global–local changes were shown as test items. This suggests that
human perception may be tuned to process global properties
through experience and that the global bias emerges when assess-
ing novelty in stimuli that change both globally and locally. Recent
research has indicated that perceptual groupings based on form
similarity are not demonstrated by infants until 6 or 7 months of
age, suggesting that gestalt grouping principles also emerge over
time and with experience (Quinn, Bhatt, Brush, Grimes, & Sharp-
nack, 2002).
Global and gestalt processing are clearly tuned with experience
in humans to show a particular bias. It is intriguing to ask whether
other primates that are not human show a particular bias as adults.
Human and nonhuman primates’ visual systems seem quite similar
in processing at the sensory level (De Valois & Jacobs, 1968;
Fobes & King, 1982), but perhaps changes in perceiving occur at
a later perceptual or cognitive level. Some researchers have sug-
gested that the global precedence effect emerged in recent primate
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evolution and that it splits the perceptual processing styles of
monkeys from those of apes, including humans (Fagot, Tomonaga,
& Deruelle, 2001; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002). Global processing
biases allow primates to generalize across objects that differ in
many local details and thus would allow broad superordinate
categories to be formed and labeled, like a type of animal or tree
as opposed to other fauna or flora. Local processing would yield
discriminations based on internal changes of features, like color or
texture, and would be relevant to discrimination of ripe foods or
the identity of individuals. There are obvious advantages to dis-
criminating on the basis of local detail and on the basis of global
change, and it is likely the case that many species of animals can
discriminate on the basis of both sets of cues (e.g., for pigeons see
Fremouw, Herbranson, & Shimp, 2002). However, the kinds of
biases different species of animals show when confronted with
similar stimuli indicate the basic perceptual differences in how
they naturally see objects in the world. It is possible that a marker
for evolutionary differences is how the brain naturally processes
features of objects, with certain hierarchical organizations of input
leading to different levels of cognitions. In this way, the organi-
zation of perceptual input may define important cognitive differ-
ences in the thinking of apes as opposed to monkeys.
Studies of chimpanzees have demonstrated global precedence,
as evidenced by their attending to the outer contour of forms
(Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 1992), by their learning to respond first
to the outer contour (Fujita & Matsuzawa, 1990), or by their
processing of the overall shape of forms better than the local
elements by which the forms were constructed (Hopkins & Wash-
burn, 2002). It is interesting to note that chimpanzees sometimes
fail to show a global precedence effect though. Fagot and To-
monaga (1999) tested chimpanzees in a compound visual search
task and found that humans but not chimpanzees showed a global
stimulus processing advantage. In this study, chimpanzees at-
tended to both local and global levels and showed an advantage for
processing at a local level when stimuli were presented in a sparse
display (with an interelement distance larger than 0.4 cm). In the
Hopkins and Washburn (2002) study that showed a global prece-
dence effect in chimpanzees, the interelement distance was 1.0
mm.
A number of studies have suggested that many species of New
World and Old World monkeys show a local bias in that research-
ers suggested that monkeys process first or more accurately the
local features of stimuli. Curiously, the effect is often expressed
not by a local bias but by a lack of global precedence effect. For
example, a lack of global precedence effect was reported in rhesus
monkeys in a sequential matching-to-sample task (Hopkins &
Washburn, 2002). By response accuracy, the rhesus monkeys
attended to both local and global changes to match stimuli that
were presented. Tanaka and Fujita (2000) found mixed results in
terms of response accuracy by 2 rhesus monkeys to global and
local changes because 1 monkey showed a global advantage in
accuracy whereas the other seemed equivalently accurate in local
and global tasks. Fagot and Deruelle (1997) tested baboons and
humans in a split-screen matching-to-sample task and showed a
local processing preference in baboons, later replicating the global
precedence effect with the same stimuli in humans. The experi-
menters found that reducing the interelement distance had some
effect on overcoming the local precedence effect in baboons
(Fagot et al., 2001). Spinozzi, De Lillo, and Truppa (2003) also
found a local processing bias in capuchin monkeys in a simulta-
neous matching-to-sample task by using displays with interele-
ment distances of 0.6 cm, but this local bias was diminished, and
equivalent processing of both global and local displays occurred
with dense displays with interelement distances of approximately
0.4 cm. The performance of the monkeys with dense displays was
very similar to the matching accuracies of 3- and 4.5-year-old
children in the same task (De Lillo, Spinozzi, Truppa, & Naylor,
2005). Unlike the monkeys, though, the children showed equiva-
lently high accuracies to local or global changes regardless of the
density of the stimulus presentation. It is important to note that the
children in this study were in two sequential experiments in which
they were first exposed to medium displays and then exposed to
dense and sparse displays. The children matched correctly all
trials, but this might be due to the extensive exposure they re-
ceived. Dukette and Stiles (1996) reported that 4-year-old children
with limited exposure to the training stimuli show a local bias with
sparse element displays but not with dense element displays.
In humans, babies often show attention differences at the local
and global levels. Young children have shown a heightened sen-
sitivity toward local changes with sparse displays (Dukette &
Stiles, 1996) but typically have shown sensitivities toward both
local and global properties with dense displays (De Lillo et al.,
2005; Dukette & Stiles, 1996). Older children and adults have
shown a global precedence effect that is unaffected by stimulus
display densities (Dukette & Stiles, 1996, 2001), and so the per-
ceptual processing of stimuli by adult humans is quite different
from that which occurs in early cognitive development. Do other
adult primates show a bias toward global assessment? The data
suggest the answer is most often no. Some studies reported a
performance advantage in monkeys to local changes in the stim-
ulus when sparse element displays were used, suggesting that adult
monkeys’ processing matches young human children’s toward
global or local biases based on stimulus conditions. It is important
to note here that whereas young children’s processing obviously
changes developmentally from a focus induced by stimulus con-
ditions to a focus that is predominantly global, the monkeys show
a stimulus-induced processing style as adults and thus show a
different endpoint to their development and experience. Even more
important, the monkeys’ processing style is inferred from only a
low number of studies, most of which do not compare the results
of adults and children with adult monkeys. It is important to
compare directly the discrimination performances of adult humans,
young children, and monkeys in a task using sparse and dense
stimuli to definitively demonstrate whether adult monkeys’ abili-
ties match those of young children and to determine whether either
of these two groups matches the processing style of adult humans.
In our study, a total of 35 college students, twelve 5-year-old
children, and 8 adult cotton-top tamarins were divided into two
groups so that approximately half were in a “few elements” con-
dition (n  17, n  6, and n  4, respectively) and half were in
a “many elements” condition (n  18, n  6, and n  4,
respectively). All subjects participated in a training discrimination
in which they had to respond differentially to circles made out of
small blue circle elements (Cc) and squares made out of small blue
square elements (Ss). Two different densities of the smaller ele-
ments were used to create the “few” and “many” conditions. In the
few condition, there were 8 elements that made up the global
shape. In the many condition, there were 16 elements used to make
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up the global shape. For humans, the training task was a category
discrimination in which they learned to hit one letter on a computer
keyboard when they saw a Cc and a different letter on the key-
board when they saw an Ss. Humans saw only one stimulus at a
time but had to use memory of salient perceptual cues to determine
which particular stimulus required a particular response to acquire
a reward (in the form of a happy face). A computer task was used
for humans to collect reaction times as well as accuracy, for it was
unclear a priori whether accuracy could vary across the types of
stimuli (few vs. many), whereas time to respond might.
For monkeys, the training task was a go/no-go discrimination in
which they were required to respond to a card with a Cc and not
an Ss to acquire rewards. The monkey task was slightly different
than the human task in that monkeys were presented with two
cards and were required to select one to complete a trial. Still, the
cognitive work is similar in that the monkeys had to use memory
for which particular perceptual cues (circle shape or circle ele-
ments) were associated with a response to acquire rewards (in the
form of cereal treats). It was found in prior operant work that the
monkeys could not make discrete responses toward a computer
screen to select a stimulus because of the physical constraints
imposed by large paws, nor could they readily learn to push
particular buttons to indicate a choice and, in fact, had great
difficulty associating an arbitrary response on a manipulandum
(like a lever or keyboard) with events. The monkeys readily
selected items, such as cups and cards, and so a go/no-go task
seemed preferable in that the exact stimuli could be used with the
same response requirements in a slightly different format.
Subsequent to the training task, the test measured the kind of
response emitted to stimuli that presented conflicting properties,
for example a circle shape (S for global property) made of square
elements (S for local property) or a square shape (S for global
property) made of circle elements (S for local property). In
humans, a categorical response on the keyboard would indicate
which property they assessed predominantly in the new stimulus,
global or local. In the monkeys, accuracy to select the novel card
as an S or an S was assessed to determine to which property,
global or local, they showed a bias. Selecting circle shapes regard-
less of the elements used to construct them would indicate a global
bias, whereas selecting circle elements regardless of the shape they
composed would indicate a local bias in monkeys.
Method
Subjects
Human children (Homo sapiens). There were 13 children between 55
months and 62 months of age who participated. Of the subjects, 1 was
eliminated because he failed to reach the 80% correct criterion in the
training phase of the study. The subjects were solicited from Longfellow
School, which housed 10 different kindergarten classes in Northfield,
Minnesota. The children were scheduled for a 40-min session in the
evening in a laboratory at Carleton College, and a parent or guardian was
present who gave consent by signing a form. Subjects were rewarded with
stickers, a certificate, and a t-shirt for volunteering. They were randomly
placed into the few or many condition by a flip of the coin, with the
additional constraint of counterbalancing the number of subjects between
the two conditions.
Human adults (Homo sapiens). A total of 35 college students were
solicited for participation from various introductory courses at Carleton
College. All subjects were between 18 and 22 years of age, and all signed
a consent form before participating in a 30-min session scheduled at an
evening time in the laboratory. The subjects were placed in either the few
or the many condition by a flip of a coin, with the constraints of counter-
balancing number across the two conditions and making the genders
equivalent within each condition. There were 17 students placed in the few
condition and 18 placed in the many condition.
Adult cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). A total of 8 adult
cotton-top tamarins, 4 female tamarins (Fozzy, Encore, Ophelia, and
Olympia) and 4 male tamarins (Mac, Zhivago, Rolo, and Willow), were
placed in one of two groups (few or many) for the study. There were 2 of
each sex placed in the few group and 2 of each sex placed in the many
group. All subjects had been monkey-family reared in laboratory settings
and had been socially housed in pairs in five different 0.85  1.50 
2.30 m cages, with the cages visually separated by opaque sheets. The
subjects were on a 12-hr light–dark cycle and had free access to water. All
animals were maintained on a complete diet consisting of a yogurt and
applesauce breakfast, a lunch of Zupreem Marmoset chow, Mazuri New
World Monkey dry chow, fruits and vegetables, and a protein snack (e.g.,
eggs, hamburger, mealworms) daily. Subjects had been exposed to mirrors
and to digitized pictures of themselves (Neiworth, Anders, & Parsons,
2001), to digitized pictures of other animals (Neiworth, Parsons, & Hassett,
2004), and to hidden treats in cups (Neiworth, Burman, Basile, & Lickteig,
2002; Neiworth et al., 2003). None of them had been exposed to graphic
stimuli on cards before this study, and none had been trained to select one
of two cards in a response task before.
Materials
The stimuli in the training phase were Cc and Ss. The circle elements
were 4.0 mm in diameter, and the square elements were 4.0 mm  4.0 mm.
The global circle shapes were 5.5 cm in diameter, whereas the global
square shapes were 4.1 cm  4.1 cm. Examples of each are shown in
Figure 1.
Two different densities of the smaller elements were used to create the
few and many conditions. In the few condition, 8 elements made up the
global shape, with an approximate interelement distance of 1.4 cm. In the
many condition, 16 elements were used to make up the global shape, with
an interelement distance of approximately 0.4 cm. For humans, these
shapes were presented, via PsyScope 1.2.5 (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, &
Provost, 1993) on a Power Macintosh G4 computer, at any one of five
different locations on a white background projected on a monitor measur-
ing 44.0 cm diagonally. The stimulus moved across trials to different
locations to engage the attention of the human subjects. For tamarins, these
stimuli were printed at the center of 7.6 cm  12.7 cm laminated white
cards.
For the test, four new stimuli were constructed with the two density
arrays and a mixing of the same global shapes and same elements. They
included a circle made of squares (Cs) and a square made out of circles
(Sc). These were constructed with few elements, or 8 elements, and with
many elements, or 16 elements. Examples are provided in Figure 1.
Apparatus
The apparatus used for human adults and children was an Apple Power
Macintosh G4 computer on which the stimuli were presented on the
monitor, and responses were recorded from its keyboard. The keyboard’s
keys were covered by a cardboard sheet, with squares cut out to expose
only the Z and the slash keys. The program PsyScope (Version 1.2.5) was
used to design the trials, present the stimuli, and collect responses, includ-
ing keyboard responses and reaction times.
The apparatus used for tamarins was a white projector cart measuring
1.17 m in height with a top shelf measuring 40 cm  50 cm. On any trial
in training or testing, two cards measuring 7.6 cm  12.7 cm were placed
20 cm from the front (subject side) of the cart and 10 cm from the sides of
the cart, with a separation of 20–30 cm from each other.
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Procedure
Training and testing children. After interacting with parent and child,
obtaining consent from the parent, and seating the child in front of the
computer, the following instructions were read to each subject:
I’m going to show you two different objects on this screen. See the Z
and the slash keys? You should put your fingers on them. One key
goes with one object, and the other key goes with the other object. I
can’t tell you which one goes with which, but the computer will smile
at you if you figure it out. It will also show you a frown if the key does
not go with the object you see. Try to get as many smiles as you can.
Subjects saw stimuli only from their designated condition, so subjects in
the few condition saw stimuli constructed of 8 elements both in training
and in testing, and subjects in the many condition saw stimuli constructed
of 16 elements both in training and in testing. The training session com-
prised twenty 60-s trials that presented Cc and Ss 10 times each, pseudo-
randomly mixed with the constraints that no more than three of one type
could appear consecutively and all five monitor locations were used
equivalently. At the beginning of each trial, a central fixation point asterisk
was shown on the screen for 300 ms. Then a stimulus, either a Cc or an Ss,
was presented at any one of five locations on the screen: centered on the
screen or in the upper left, upper right, lower left, or lower right quadrants
of the screen. The stimulus remained on until a keyboard response was
made or until 60 s elapsed. Responses to the Z key were correct for the Cc,
and responses to the slash key were correct for the Ss. If the subject
responded correctly, a cartoon face smiling appeared in the center of the
screen for 15 s. If the subject responded incorrectly, a cartoon face
frowning appeared for 15 s. There was a varying intertrial interval between
trials such that each subject could wait until he or she was ready to start the
next trial. The next trial was initiated by the experimenter by hitting the
space bar on the keyboard, and this was done when the child was looking
at the screen again and had fingers on the two relevant keys on the
keyboard. If no response was emitted within the 60-s trial, a blank screen
followed and the experimenter started the next trial with a keyboard
response when the child appeared ready to play.
If the subject reached a criterion of 80% accuracy within the first phase
of training, he or she would proceed to testing. If accuracy was less than
80%, another training session was initiated. If the subject did not reach
criterion after the second session, the subject was given his or her rewards
and the study ended without a test. Of the subjects, 1 was not tested, and
the other 12 subjects learned the task and proceeded to testing.
The instructions during the test session were as follows:
Good work! Now I have one more game involving objects for you to
play. This time the same two objects will appear, and the same two
keys need to be touched to get smiley faces. But there are also some
more objects mixed in here and I don’t know the right answer to them
so you won’t see a smile or a frown to them. I just want you to tell me
by hitting one of those two keys which key you think the object
belongs to.
The test session comprised 32 trials, with 20 training trials and 12 test
trials intermixed in a pseudorandom fashion with the constraint that no
more than three trial types were repeated. The trials all progressed as
before, with a fixation point for 300 ms followed by the stimulus for 60 s.
The 20 training trials were Cc and Ss, presented twice at each of the five
screen locations. The 12 test trials were Cs and Sc, and each of these types
was presented twice at each of three screen locations (center, upper left,
and upper right; or center, lower left, and lower right). The same two keys,
Z and slash, were the response keys and were rewarded (Z for the Cc and
slash for the Ss) in the training trials. In test trials, no feedback was given
to the subject for a response. The Z key response was coded a local
response for the stimulus Sc because it indicated that the subject catego-
rized the shape made of circle elements as a circle type. Similarly, the slash
key response was coded as a local response for the stimulus Cs. On the
other hand, if the stimulus Cs generated a Z key response, then that was
coded a global response because the subject was categorizing on the basis
of the global shape and not the elements of construction. Similarly, a slash
key response to the Sc stimulus was coded as a global response. Response
times and responses were recorded, and accuracy was calculated for the
training trials at the end of each session.
Training and testing adult humans. Once the adults signed
consent to participate and were seated in front of the computer
screen, each subject was read instructions similar to those read to
the children, with the exception that the adult subjects were in-
structed to press the space bar when they wanted to initiate the next
trial. This meant that their intertrial intervals could vary, but the
actual trial length remained the same (60 s). The adults were
presented the same training and testing programs as the children
with the same two response keys trained to categorize Cc (the Z
key) and Ss (the slash key). All subjects were tested in the same
manner and with the same number of test trials and feedback as the
children. The adults received cookies and $5 as a reward for
participating in the experiment, rather than stickers and a t-shirt.
Reaction times and response choices were recorded.
Figure 1. The left panel shows the training stimuli, with the S, the
circle made of circles, and the S, the square made of squares. The right
panel shows the test conflict stimuli, which combine S and S proper-
ties. The top panel shows the stimuli used in the “many” condition; the
bottom panel shows the stimuli in the “few” condition.
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Training and testing adult monkeys. Daily training sessions
presented stimuli with few elements or stimuli with many elements
exclusively, on the basis of the subject’s assignment to condition.
Each session comprised twenty 60-s trials. For each trial, the
subject’s name was called to gain his or her attention and then two
cards were placed on the cart inside the subject’s home cage. One
of the cards was a Cc, whereas the other was an Ss. The circle
stimulus was the S, and a response to it, defined as moving the
card physically on the cart with a front paw, was rewarded with a
piece of cereal (either Froot Loop or Frosted Cheerio). Once the
two cards were placed on the cart, the experimenter started a
stopwatch to time 60 s and stared at a fixation point straight ahead.
She noted the choice of the tamarin by looking down only when
the tamarin was making a choice and had moved a card. If the
correct card was selected, the subject was handed a cereal. If the
response was incorrect, the experimenter said “no” and removed
both cards from the cart. An intertrial interval of 15 s separated the
trials, and during that time the experimenter recorded the choice
and selected cards for the next trial. If the subject did not make a
response within 60 s of the start of a trial, the experimenter
removed the cards and marked the trial as aborted. After a 15-s
intertrial interval, the trial was repeated, and if the subject did not
respond for three consecutive trials, the session was terminated.
The location of the S was counterbalanced so that it occurred
on the left and right sides equally often within any one session. A
total of six different sequences of 20 trials were constructed and
used pseudorandomly across days. Once subjects acquired 80%
accuracy within a single session, they were tested.
There were five consecutive test sessions conducted, each with
a different sequence of trials, and each with 10 training trials
intermixed with 10 test trials. The training trials presented the S
and S, and correct responses were rewarded. There were 5
different test trial types, 4 of which compared a novel stimulus
with a training stimulus, and 1 of which pitted two novel stimuli
against each other. Any response to any card in the test trials was
rewarded. The original S card (Cc) was paired with a novel circle
(Cs) or with a novel square (Sc). The original S was also paired
with a novel square (Sc) and a novel circle (Cs). In the critical
conflict test trial, two novel stimuli were shown: a Cs was com-
pared with an Sc. Both stimuli were equally novel, and both
contained a negative property (squares) and a positive property
(circles). If subjects processed the global property predominantly,
then they would select the Cs card in the conflict test trials, and
cards containing global circle shapes (C) in the other examples. If
the subjects processed the local property predominantly, then they
would select the Sc card more often in the conflict test condition
and cards containing circle elements in the other examples.
Results
First, it seemed that all subject groups learned the discrimination
relatively easily. Of the 12 children who were tested, 1 child
required two 20-trial training sessions to achieve 80% accuracy at
categorizing the two objects. The other 11 children learned the
discrimination in 1 training session. All 35 adult subjects learned
the discrimination in 1 training session. On average, it took tama-
rins 9.62 sessions to achieve 80% correct performance in the
discrimination task, with a range between 3 sessions and 17
sessions. The mean number of sessions to criterion for monkey
subjects in the few condition was 12.75 sessions and the mean for
subjects in the many condition was 6.50 sessions. By a Mann–
Whitney U test for independent groups with small samples (e.g.,
n  4 in each group), the difference in learning rates between the
two groups of monkeys was a nonsignificant trend (U  2, p 
.057) with power estimated from a parametric test of the same data
at 0.36, F(1, 6)  3.66, p  .10 (effect size  0.38).
The important data to examine were the global response biases
to test stimuli that showed conflicting properties. A fixed factor
analysis of variance1 compared age (children vs. adults) and con-
dition (few vs. many) on mean percentage of global responses per
subject with both novel test stimuli (Cs and Sc). The main effect
of age was significant, F(1, 43)  4.12, p  .048 (effect size 
0.09, power  0.51), and this was due to the adults responding
with a stronger global bias (M  86.19%) than the children (M 
71.76%). The main effect of condition was also significant, F(1,
43)  7.40, p  .01 (effect size  0.15, power  0.76), because
of a stronger global bias in the many condition (M  87.15%) than
in the few condition (M  77.67%). There was a significant
interaction effect of Age  Condition, F(1, 43)  8.28, p  .01
(effect size  0.16, power  0.80). Figure 2 depicts the interaction
in terms of the mean percentage global responses by adult and
young humans to the test stimuli. It is clear in this graph that the
significant difference between children and adults and between the
few and many conditions was induced by a significant loss of
global bias by children in the few condition. Independent groups t
tests comparing children’s mean global response scores in the few
and many conditions verified a significantly stronger global bias in
the many condition (M  91.67%) than the few condition (M 
51.85%), t(10)  4.93, p  .01. There was no significant
difference between adults’ global responses in the many and few
conditions, t(33)  0.14, p  .89.
Because the number of monkey subjects in each condition was
small (n  4) and the task was not identical, a separate nonpara-
metric Mann–Whitney U test compared monkeys’ global biases
across the many and few conditions. A mean global response was
calculated for each monkey on the basis of the percentage of trials
on which the response choice was made toward the Cs elements as
opposed to the Sc elements, when the two stimuli were paired
together. The responses to these exact stimuli were analyzed for
humans. The means for monkeys in the few and many conditions
are presented in Figure 2, and the Mann–Whitney U test revealed
a significant difference in global response (U  1, p  .03), with
monkeys in the few condition showing equivalent choice between
local and global cues (M  52.50%) and the monkeys in the many
condition showing a strong global bias to the novel stimuli (M 
70.00%). Power of this effect generated from parametric compar-
isons of the same data is 0.64, F(1, 6)  7.74, p  .03 (effect
size  0.56).
The monkeys in the few condition were either noting both local
and global features and thus showing less bias toward a global
response or, alternatively, resorting to responding at chance levels,
thus generating 50% global response. One-sample t tests were
1 This analysis was conducted once it was determined from a Levene’s
test of equality of error variances that, whereas the two groups of humans
varied in size, the data generated from the groups were similar in terms of
distribution, F(3, 43)  0.80, p  .49.
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conducted to compare the accuracies of these monkeys and the
monkeys in the many condition with chance level responding, or
50% correct, to the training trials and the test trials. In the few test
condition, the subjects’ accuracy to the original discrimination was
maintained at a level significantly above 50% (M  65.50%),
t(3)  4.84, p  .02, but their global responding in the test trials
showed equivalent responding to local and global cues (M 
52.50%), t(3)  0.52, p  .64. In the many condition in testing, the
subjects’ accuracy to the original discrimination was maintained
significantly above chance level (M  70.50%), t(3)  5.86, p 
.01, and their global response bias was significantly above a level
of equivalence and toward global choices (M  70.00%), t(3) 
4.90, p  .02.
A final analysis examined the monkeys’ global response bias
toward the other novel trial types. A mean global response was
calculated per subject as the percentage of times the subject
selected the circle shape between the pairs in the test trials,
regardless of the elements by which it was constructed. A Mann–
Whitney U test compared the mean global response of subjects in
the many condition with the mean global response of subjects in
the few condition, and it revealed a significant difference (U  0,
p  .014), indicating that the subjects in the many condition were
significantly more biased toward global responding (M  68.75%)
than subjects were in the few condition (M  48.12%).
Discussion
This study replicated the finding that adult humans are biased to
note global properties of stimuli before local properties. In a task
that required categorization via a keyboard response of graphic
stimuli, the adult humans overwhelmingly responded to any global
circle shape that appeared as though it belonged in the Cc category.
They rarely put a different global shape, an Sc, in the Cc category.
They seemed to ignore the local property of circle elements and led
with global shape. This bias was unaffected by the density of the
displays of local elements, for in both the few and the many
elements condition, adult humans showed a strong global bias in
their responses.
In contrast, 5-year-old children showed a global bias in their
categorical assessment only if they were shown dense displays, as
in the many elements condition. In this condition, the fact that the
global shape was composed of 16 elements induced children to
process the stimuli by global shape. This led them to show a strong
global bias in categorizing Cs in the Cc category, and conversely,
to not categorize Sc elements in the Cc category.
However, children of the same age with a similarly high level of
accuracy before testing (M  93.33% for children in the few
condition) did not show a global bias in categorizing if they were
originally presented shapes constructed of few elements. The chil-
dren in this condition learned the discrimination very well, but
their discrimination was based on both the global shape and the
elements by which the shape was constructed. This led children to
sometimes respond to a Cs as if it belonged to the Ss category,
presumably because they shared local property features, and they
sometimes put this novel stimulus into the Cc category because of
its shared global property feature. It is important to note that the
children in the few condition who showed this kind of equivalence
judgment between local and global assessments were not poorer
performers than the children in the many condition; children in
both conditions showed very accurate performance to the training
stimuli before the test (95.00% and 93.33% accuracy, respec-
tively), and they maintained this high level of performance during
the test. They simply chose different ways to proceed when they
saw the new stimuli that combined local and global features in
novel ways. This difference in processing was induced by the
change in the density of the displays. It is unlikely that visual
acuity could cause the global bias in the many condition because
in both conditions, the size of the elements remained the same, and
the discriminations were acquired similarly. In sum, at this level of
cognitive development, children seem capable of processing at the
local and global levels equivalently but can become biased toward
global assessments if features within the stimulus emphasize
global properties (i.e., dense displays that emphasize the contour of
the shape more). Dukette and Stiles (1996, 2001) found this same
result in similarly aged children.
When New World monkeys were tested in a discrimination task
very similar to the ones used with humans, their responses in
testing revealed that they were biased toward global assessment if
they had been trained with dense displays. When dense displays
were used in training in the many condition, monkeys randomly
placed in that condition continued to assess novel stimuli like Cs
as if the global shape was the defining feature on which to
discriminate. If sparse displays were used in training, as in the few
condition, monkeys randomly placed in that condition learned the
discrimination well but seemed to discriminate between both the
local properties and the global properties. Thus, they sometimes
chose the Cs as similar to the S, because of its global shape, and
other times avoided it as though it were the S, because of its
square elements. The monkeys in the few condition did not show
poorer performance in making the initial discrimination and main-
tained their original discrimination throughout testing, so this
result is not due to the monkeys in the few condition transferring
poorly to the test condition. There is no reason to conclude that
Figure 2. Mean global response to the conflict stimuli by adult humans,
5-year-old children, and adult tamarin subjects. Error bars are confidence
intervals around the means.
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tamarins would simply “guess” whenever they were presented
novel cards in testing; in fact, individuals of the same species
placed in the many elements condition did not resort to guessing
when they saw the same novel cards in the test following the same
kind of training. It is more parsimonious with the entire data set to
conclude that the monkeys in the few condition, rather than guess-
ing in novel trials, were actually attempting to discriminate, that
they did so continually for the original S and S, but that they
also simply recognized the problems inherent in a stimulus con-
taining both S and S properties and then categorized those
problems as such.
Past published work has shown monkeys either to process
global and local properties equivalently or to show a local pro-
cessing bias. Our study suggests that monkeys can notice both the
local and global properties of a stimulus and that the attentional
allocation to each property is intricately tied to the stimulus itself.
Monkeys attend to the local features of a stimulus especially when
the stimulus features are spread out. Unlike adult humans, mon-
keys do not automatically favor perceiving the overall contour or
place relationship. In fact, because the interelement distance seems
the critical ingredient in monkeys’ processing biases, the results
suggest that monkeys may be biased toward perceiving the nature
relationship in objects, or the interelement relationships. Why then
did it take the monkeys almost twice as many sessions to learn the
discrimination in the few condition? With sparse stimuli, an in-
ability to inhibit the processing of local elements can localize what
would normally be perceived as perceptually coherent, and this
might make the global shape harder to perceive. Interpreted more
broadly, this processing style would lead monkeys to learn more
slowly all the features relevant in sparse arrays and show a conflict
between attending to global and local features.
Young children show a similar failure to inhibit the processing
of both local and global features when the stimuli they perceive are
constructed of elements in a sparse array. We know that young
children will develop the adult assessment style of global prece-
dence at some point, most likely around age 6, according to
Dukette and Stiles (1996). Adult monkeys show a style of pro-
cessing that favors both local and global processing and that is thus
arrested at the level of young children.
The performance of monkeys as fully developed organisms
seems more comparable with the perceptual processing of humans
with autism. A critical finding that has emerged in the study of
people with autism is that they note letters in Navon-style figures
at both the global and local levels equivalently (Brosnan, Scott,
Fox, & Pye, 2004), and they show marked deficits in using gestalt
principles as compared with delayed learning control groups.
These outcomes suggest that individuals with autism cannot pro-
cess higher level units (i.e., global properties) before lower level
units (i.e., local properties), and they are less capable of perceiving
interelement relationships as part of a global structure. There are
some marked advantages that people with autism show that sug-
gest a lack of hierarchy in their processing; for example, people
with autism display an abnormal proficiency on tasks such as
copying impossible figures (Mottron, Belleville, & Menard, 1999)
and finding embedded figures (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah
& Frith, 1983). By not organizing in favor of global precedence,
they find it easier to detect local details to find hidden objects and
focus on local, albeit impossible, features of a stimulus.
It is possible that monkeys perceive stimuli in ways very similar
to humans with autism. Young children also showed in this study
a lack of hierarchical processing to certain stimuli, but because
their visual–cognitive system will develop to show global bias and
hierarchical processing after age 6, the abnormality demonstrated
by young children is not a good model of the fixed abnormality
existing in autism-diagnosed people. Because monkeys are show-
ing this problem as adults, the processing conflict for them seems
fixed. Speculative claims about the source of this problem in
autistic people include a lack of connectivity between brain areas
that would normally allow for hierarchical pattern processing to
develop or a lack of temporal binding between firing patterns that
would normally produce templates or global representations of
objects (Brock, Brown, Boucher, & Rippon, 2002). More research
testing monkeys’ ability to assess global and local properties, the
malleability of assessments based on interelement distances, and
monkeys’ assessment of gestalt groupings is needed to verify the
similarity in perceptual processing between people with autism
and monkey subjects. If supported, an animal model of autism
could emerge that would help us to identify the neural mechanisms
responsible for the perceptual deficits found in autism. An animal
model could produce benefits in terms of developing tests for
earlier diagnosis on the basis of perceptual reactions to stimuli. An
animal model would allow for development of different treatment
programs that may allow neural training or enhancement. From
this study alone, the tamarins show perception similar to those of
people with autism to sparse displays, but with particular kinds of
training with shapes that emphasize the global property, individ-
uals of this species could overcome their fixation on processing at
both local and global levels and show a global advantage. It is an
intriguing endeavor to develop training programs that would in-
duce monkeys to see the forest despite the details of the trees and
to determine whether cognitive training would induce hierarchical
assessments in individuals with autism as well.
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